Bay: Acts and Resolves (1869 ed.), at 335, id., at 374 Mass. Thus, Yates was imprisoned during the pleasure of the court for a criminal contempt. The commitment in this case was not for the purpose of forcing Yates to comply with the will of the Chancery Court, but rather, for punishment. He was sent to jail "there to remain until the further order of the court." On writ of habeas corpus the New York Supreme Court held that this was a valid form of commitment and that the Supreme Court had no power to discharge anyone committed for contempt by the Chancery Court. Yates, an officer of the Court of Chancery, was found in contempt for having forged a name upon a bill filed in that court. One post-colonial case is worthy of mention, the case of John V.See Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 Col.
This reading of the statute is buttressed by the repeated references in the congressional debates to suits where the United States is a "party." See, e. entered in any suit or action brought or prosecuted in the name of, or on behalf of, the United States." (Emphasis added.) The touchstone of the exemption is thus the party who brought or prosecuted the basic suit or action, not the party upon whose motion the violated order was entered. It only exempts contempts committed in disobedience of "any lawful. entered" upon motion by the United States.
#PANOPLY 14740 TRIAL#
But the applicable statute does not exempt from the protection of a jury trial "contempts committed in disobedience of any lawful. " The Court of Appeals entered the temporary restraining order of September 25, 1962, on motion made by the United States pursuant to this authorization. It also authorized the United States "to submit pleadings, evidence, arguments and briefs and to initiate such further proceedings, including proceedings for injunctive relief and proceedings for contempt of court. Even assuming, arguendo, that the Court of Appeals' order of September 25, 1962, had some independent legal significance, I could not conclude, as the Court does, that it was "entered in any suit or action brought or prosecuted in the name of, or on behalf of, the United States." The Court of Appeals' order authorizing the United States to participate in the case, authorizing it to participate "as amicus curiae," not as a party.Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure thereafter set down the procedural requirements for all contempt actions, providing that "he defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in any case in which an act of Congress so provides." Go to But the Clayton Act further provides that the requirement of a jury does not apply to "contempts committed in disobedience of any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command entered in any suit or action brought or prosecuted in the name of, or on behalf of, the United States, but the same, and all other cases of contempt not specifically embraced in this section may be punished in conformity to the prevailing usages at law." 18 U.S.C.
These sections guarantee the right to a jury trial in contempt proceedings arising out of disobedience to orders "of any district court of the United States or any court of the District of Columbia," provided that the conduct complained of also constitutes a criminal offense under the laws of the United States or of any State. The alleged contemners claim, however, that the powers granted federal courts under § 401 were limited by the Congress in 1914 by the provisions of §§ 21, 22 and 24 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat.
Watson has also been cited by this Court as authority on criminal contempt. State, supra, where the Mississippi Supreme Court reaffirmed that there is no right to jury trial in cases of criminal contempt. Further, Watson has recently been cited with approval in a Mississippi criminal contempt case, Young v.
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